In March
2011, Sunni Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, swept over the bridge into
Bahrain to help crush the predominantly Shiite but democratic and
reform-oriented protest movement. The wide-ranging campaign of sectarian
repression that followed destroyed a U.S.-facilitated reconciliation mission
between the Bahraini crown prince and the leading opposition parties.
Washington
then watched as the inevitable unfolded in a key Gulf ally — repression with
impunity, persistent instability, rampant sectarianism, the likely permanent delegitimization
of the regime, and a denunciation of the U.S. role by both sides. Its failure
to respond defined American hypocrisy about the Arab uprisings in the eyes of
many across the region, and helped give a green light to autocrats to crack
down on their challengers. More than two years later, Bahrain’s continued street
protests and growing radicalism suggests how little the crackdown served the
cause of stability.
While
events in Cairo are of course very different, the risks for Washington are similar.
Once again, the United States seems helpless as a crucial ally — in this case
the Egyptian military — recklessly flaunts democratic norms. The persistent
instability and disillusionment with the democratic process likely to follow the
coup was obvious even before this week’s violent clashes and Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s
alarming
call for mass protests in support of a new “war on terror” against the
Muslim Brotherhood. Once again, Washington seems torn between its hope for
democratization on the one hand, and its distaste for the aggrieved parties (Muslim
Brothers in Cairo, possibly Iran-backed Shiites in Bahrain) and strategic ties
to the ascendant authoritarians on the other.
Faced
with this dilemma, Washington has tried to hide. President Barack Obama’s
administration will reportedly
tell lawmakers that it does not consider an obvious coup in Cairo to be a
coup, and that its annual aid to Egypt will keep flowing. Secretary of State John
Kerry bafflingly mused that the military might have prevented a civil war,
which is a defensible
analytical position but not the sort of thing that a senior U.S. official
should be saying aloud. Finally, the White House belatedly announced it was suspending
the delivery of four F-16s
to the Egyptian military — but declined to suspend a major joint military
exercise or its $1.3 billion in annual aid.
It’s
easy to understand why the United States hedged its bets. The mass protests on
June 30, the July 3 coup, the escalating Muslim Brotherhood protests, the
dissolution of virtually all political institutions, and this week’s seemingly
unstoppable charge toward full-scale repression have seemingly shattered America’s
roadmap for the country’s transition to democracy. With the military in charge and
politics driven by competing street protests, there are no longer any
established rules to the political game. And things weren’t going well even
before the coup: Egypt’s economy was in free-fall, street clashes were
increasingly violent, and many Egyptians were deeply alarmed by the unilateral
and majoritarian behavior of Mohamed Morsy’s government.
It’s not
like Egyptians particularly want Washington to do anything, either. Its
politicians and public figures instead unanimously tell the United States to
buzz off and mind its own business. The wave
of anti-Americanism that swept Cairo’s streets in the wake of the military
takeover, no matter how politically motivated, has to be disturbing for a White
House that prided itself on reaching out to newly empowered Arab publics. But quite
frankly, a lot of people in Washington seem downright relieved to be rid of the
troublesome Muslim Brotherhood and the endless crises of attempted
democratization, and happy to just get
back to working with a friendly military regime. A new Mubarakism may not be
pretty, but it doesn’t look so bad to a lot of Americans exhausted by the
region’s chaos.
At this
point, the number of people who really believe the United States supports
Egyptian democracy would probably fit around a Washington think-tank conference
room table. But I would be one of those around that table — U.S. policy toward
Egypt isn’t quite the disaster it appears. America’s goal of helping to create an
institutionalized Egyptian democracy was the right one, and its low-key approach
accurately reflected its limited ability to shape events. U.S. officials
understood that Egypt’s future would be shaped by Egyptians, and that not many
Egyptians anxiously awaited a White House statement to decide what to think
about their political crisis.
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