The Kingdom of Bahr­­ain is a lot of things: the smallest Arab country in the Middle East and the only Arab island nation, a vital strategic ally of the United States which plays host to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, religiously diverse with small but native Jewish and Christian populations, the frontline of a sectarian struggle that now overshadows the Middle East, and increasingly the subject of fierce but often fair criticism with regard to its human rights failings. Here, for example, is the Washington Post’s editorial board weighing in with criticism about how Bahrain’s abuses and its growing disregard for the United States.

There is legitimacy to the grievances of the majority Shi’ites. While approximately 70 percent of Bahraini citizens are Shi‘ite, 95 percent of the unemployed are Shi’ite. There is also an element of Apartheid in Bahrain, as certain real estate remains effectively off-limits to Shi‘ites regardless of socio-economic status. The Bahraini government has also sought to shift the demographic balance of the island by granting Sunni immigrants citizenship, often in exchange for joining the security forces to which Shi’ites cannot join.

And, while it is trendy in Washington nowadays to dismiss fear of Iranian subterfuge, the Bahraini kingdom does have some reason to be suspicious. In 2011, Hasan Tariq Alhasan, (full disclosure: a former student of mine), had an illuminating article in the Middle East Journal about the 1981 coup attempt on the island. Using publications of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain gathering dust in the Library of Congress, Alhasan chronicled how the group that had plotted the putsch had declared its fealty to Ayatollah Khomeini and his Iranian Revolution and had accepted training from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The coup plotters planned to attack the palace and parliament on the tenth anniversary of independence, and perhaps reunite with Iran. (Bahrain was for a time prior to the sixteenth century a province of Iran, but Bahrainis—Sunnis and Shi‘ites both expressed their desire for independence rather than reunification in a 1970 UN-supervised referendum).

Just because Tehran was behind the 1981 coup plot doesn’t mean, of course, that all Bahrain unrest can be attributed to Iranian plots. I was in Bahrain for the beginning of the second round of unrest in the mid-1990s. Bahrainis were legitimately fed up with unemployment, and the suspension of parliament and the constitution. It was ultimately the death of the king and the succession of the crown prince (who remains king to the present day) that enabled a new political beginning. Bahrainis overwhelmingly regardless of sect endorsed a National Action Charter encompassing a reform package in February 2001.

It was frustration about the failure of King Hamad to fully implement that package that would lead to the spark that became the Pearl Monument uprising a decade later, an incident which most diplomats and analysts mark as the start of the current unrest as Shi‘ites sometimes violently protest their situation. (And while many Shi‘ites say their protests are peaceful, Molotov cocktails are not exactly non-violent).

Many Western diplomats, NGOs, and journalists dismissed Bahraini government suggestions that Iran was behind the initial 2011 unrest. Indeed, the protests appeared indigenous and the Bahraini government was unable or unwilling to provide proof of Iranian complicity, although some Bahraini officials privately suggested that Iran funded some opposition activities from the interest of bank accounts deposited in Bahraini banks.

Just because a spark might be indigenous, however, does not mean that the Iranian drive to export revolution wouldn’t lead its officials to try to co-opt the Bahraini revolution. On December 30, 2013, for example, Bahraini officials seized a weapons shipment that Iranian authorities had apparently tried to smuggle into Bahrain. And while U.S. diplomats might protest the arrest of Ali Salman, the leader of Wifaq, Bahrain’s largest Shi‘ite opposition party, it is worrying that Hezbollah’s Al Manar media company distributes CDs of his speeches set to religious music.

Against the backdrop of the Obama administration’s outreach if not surrender to Iran, it seems Iranian authorities are ramping up their aggression toward their neighbor across the Persian Gulf. On June 18, 2015, Bahrain’s chief of police announced the seizure of “significant quantities” of explosives and bomb-making materials destined for use against Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. From the Bahraini Embassy’s press release:

The raid on a house in Dar Kulaib on 6th June, in the south west of the island, came as a result of forensic intelligence gathered by Bahrain’s security forces following the seizure in May of a vehicle attempting to cross the bridge and contained similar explosives to carry out attacks in Saudi Arabia. Authorities said that the seized weapons, which included large quantities of powerful explosive, C4, in addition to commercial detonators, advanced circuitry, chemicals and mobile phones, represent a significant escalation in attempts to smuggle explosives material into Bahrain. Chief of Police Major-General Tariq Al Hasan said: “These recent developments point to an emerging trend. The professionalism with which these seized materials are assembled and concealed is a clear indication of international support and sponsorship…

He continued to accuse the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of providing training in the use of explosives as well as underwater sabotage. Below is a catalogue of the contraband seized on June 6:

• 92 Kg Urea Nitrate, a fertilizer-based high-explosive commonly used in manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
• 10 Kg C-4, a plastic explosive composed mainly of RDX (approximately 90%)
• 4 Kg TATP, also known as Acetone Peroxide, it is a white crystalline powder that is unstable and is used in manufacturing IEDs
• 89 Kg Ammonium Nitrate, a chemical compound used in agriculture and in manufacturing IEDs
• 8 anti-personnel explosives, 6 of which contain metal balls
• 2 PETN Detonators; 4.1 meters long and 10.08 meters long, these are detonator cords that have PETN explosives as their explosive core
• 23 pairs and 1 single commercial detonators
• 66 electronic circuits controlled by infrared
• 67 electronic mobile phone circuits
• 21 Nokia mobile phones
• 3 bags of large metal ball bearings
• Metal molds for containers and lids of EFPs

Herein lies the tragedy of the second order effects of Obama’s outreach to Iran: While Bahraini Shi’ites have legitimate grievances, and the Bahraini government—and, more specifically—its prime minister exhibited questionable judgment in the initial crackdown, now that the empowered Revolutionary Guards are on the march, they might de-legitimize the popular struggle in Bahrain for more equitable political and economic rights. At the same time, diplomats and editorial boards can lecture on human rights, but it should no longer be possible to ignore the security implications and international dimensions of Bahrain’s continued unrest.