The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) seeks to portray itself to the outside world as a unified entity, particularly during periods of heightened regional instability, such as Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the 2011 Arab uprisings. Yet below the surface, the Council’s six monarchies are divided internally by historic rivalries, changes in leadership and a myriad of significant regional developments. The most significant current source of division among the GCC states relates to Iran’s role in the Middle East’s evolving geopolitical order. Strategic shifts in the regional balance of power following the P5+1 and Iran’s nuclear agreement are prompting the Council’s disunity to surface in new ways, further exposing the gap between Gulf Arab unity on paper and in practice.
A Council Divided
Although the GCC officially endorsed the deal as a welcome development in freezing Tehran’s nuclear program, the six members have a divided outlook regarding the agreement’s geopolitical implications. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain’s leaders perceive the Islamic Republic as a predatory state determined to wreak havoc across the Middle East. They, along with some prominent voices in the Gulf Arab media and other GCC officials, have argued that the Islamic Republic is a troublemaker that cannot be trusted. Officials in Oman, Qatar and the Emirate of Dubai have, however, issued more genuine praise for the deal and view Iran as a neighbor that must be dealt with diplomatically. According to this perspective, Iran should be integrated into regional economic, energy and security initiatives for the GCC’s long-term benefit.
The rise of Daesh (a.k.a. “Islamic State”) in Iraq and Syria—a threat to both the GCC and Iran—is prompting some Gulf Arab rulers to consider exploring deeper cooperation with Iran in security sectors. Since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani took office in 2013, a high priority for Tehran has been to convince the smaller GCC states that it serves their national interests to engage with Iran to resolve regional crises. The first country that Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited following the nuclear agreement’s singing was Kuwait, where he declared that “Any threat to one country is a threat to all,” “No country can solve regional problems without the help of others,” “Iran stands behind the people in the region to fight against the threat of extremism, terrorism and sectarianism,” and “Our message to the regional countries is that we should fight together against this shared challenge.”
Iran’s agenda of creating partnerships with the GCC states in the fight against extremism will be challenged by certain GCC officials’ belief that Daesh’s rise to power is an outcome of Iranian influence in the Arab world. Following the nuclear agreement’s signing, some Gulf Arab authorities have continued to accuse Tehran of arming and training Shi’ite militants to destabilize the GCC states, which will naturally limit the extent to which such monarchs are likely to accept Iran as a trusted partner on security fronts.
After EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini wrote an article stating that the Iranian nuclear agreement could “open unprecedented possibilities of peace for the region, starting from Syria, Yemen, and Iraq,” an official in the UAE accused her of lacking a “context and understanding of Iran’s regional and aggressive policy and sectarian overtones that have polarized the Middle East.” On August 10, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister blamed Iran for “exporting the weapons that have caused wars and sedition” in the Middle East and maintained that Iran must not be able to reference Daesh’s rise to power as justification for Tehran’s continued interference in Arab affairs. After the deal was signed, Bahrain recalled its envoy in Iran over an exchange of heated rhetoric between Bahraini and Iranian officials and accused Tehran of being behind a foiled arms smuggling plot. Citing unnamed sources who reportedly extracted their information from interrogations of terrorist suspects, two Kuwaiti newspapers accused Tehran last month of smuggling arms into Kuwait via an Iraq-based Hezbollah unit.
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